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Abstract
We study revenue maximization by deterministic mechanisms for the simplest case for which
Myerson’s characterization does not hold: a single seller selling two items, with independently
distributed values, to a single additive buyer. We prove that optimal mechanisms are submodular
and hence monotone. Furthermore, we show that in the IID case, optimal mechanisms are
symmetric. Our characterizations are surprisingly non-trivial, and we show that they fail to
extend in several natural ways, e.g. for correlated distributions or more than two items. In
particular, this shows that the optimality of symmetric mechanisms does not follow from the
symmetry of the IID distribution.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the problem of revenue maximization by a monopolist seller in the simple
scenario when a single buyer has an additive valuation over a set of items. Our main focus is on
deterministic mechanisms, and we start with the simplest case when there are just two items for
sale. In that case, the buyer’s value for the first item is v1 ≥ 0, for the second item is v2 ≥ 0, and
for the bundle of both is v1 + v2, where the seller only knows that v1 is sampled from distribution
D1 and v2 is sampled from distribution D2, and that these values are independently sampled. Our
seller’s goal is to maximize his expected revenue when the buyer maximizes his quasi-linear utility.
This simplest of scenarios has received much attention lately as it is one of the most fundamental
examples where Myerson’s characterization of optimal auctions (for a single item) [19] ceases to
hold, and indeed optimal auctions for two items may become complex [18, 1, 17, 13, 15, 12]. In
particular, different examples are known where the optimal auction sells each of the two items
separately, sells both items as a bundle, gives a “discount price” for the bundle [13], is randomized
(i.e. uses lotteries) [17], requires an infinite number of possible randomized outcomes [12], or is
non-monotone (i.e. the revenue it extracts may decrease when the buyer’s valuations increase.)
[15].
Generally speaking we do not understand the structure of optimal auctions – neither randomized
ones nor deterministic ones – even in this simple scenario, and in fact it is known that for the case of
n items (still with a single additive buyer) determining the optimal randomized auction is #P -hard
[11] as is determining the optimal deterministic auction [9].1 On the other hand, several recent
∗Microsoft Research, moshe@microsoft.com
†Hebrew University and Microsoft Research, noam@cs.huji.ac.il
‡Harvard University, aviad@seas.harvard.edu
1Conitzer and Sandholm [10] have proven NP hardness of optimal deterministic auction for a much more general
setting.
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Figure 1: Submodular vs Supermodular Menus
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Supermodular menu (a, b, c), where c ≥ a+ b.
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Submodular menu (a, b, c), where c ≤ a+ b.
Given a menu, the incentive constraints of the buyer imply a partition of the space of valuations to four regions.
The allocation is empty in the South-West region and the revenue is 0. The first item is allocated in the South-East
region, the second in the North-West region, and the pair in the North-East region. In each of these regions we mark
the revenue for any valuation in that region. We omit the allocation, and payment when there is no sale, in all figures,
as they are the same as here. Note that the borders between any two regions are places of indifference, and as ties
are broken towards higher payments, each belongs to the neighboring region with the higher payment. The location
of the intersection of each of these borders with the axes is also marked (e.g. at (a, 0) the buyer is indifferent between
buying nothing and buying the first item.) Note that while our results are not limited to bounded valuations, our
figures are drawn as if they are upper bounded, for convenience of illustration. Finally, to avoid clutter, we explicitly
draw the axes only for the figure corresponding to the first (supermodular) menu, and eliminate them from all other
figures.
results show that simple auctions (such as selling the items separately or as a single bundle) provide
good approximations to the optimal revenue for two items [13], multiple items [16, 3], as well as
further generalizations in scenario such as multiple buyers [24], or combinatorial valuations [20], or
both [8, 6, 23] (but not when the item values are correlated [14] — except for special cases [4]).
In this paper we prove structural characterizations of the optimal deterministic mechanisms for a
monopolist seller that is selling two items to a single2 additive buyer with item values independently
distributed.3 We also show that these characterizations fail to generalize in any conceivable way:
neither to more than two items, nor to items with correlated distributions, nor to randomized
optimal mechanisms.
A general deterministic auction for two items charges prices, a and b respectively, for each of
the two items, as well as a third price c for the bundle of both items. There are basically two
2Note that results for a single buyer also hold when there are many buyers but there are no supply constraints
(digital goods).
3A deterministic mechanism for such a problem simply presents prices for each of the items, and for the pair.
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“forms” of such auctions: the first is the “submodular case” where c ≤ a+ b and the second is the
“supermodular case” where c ≥ a+ b.4 Given a menu, the incentive constraints of the buyer imply
a partition of the space of valuations to regions, in each the buyer buys the same bundle. The
different shapes of the partition that these two types of auctions induce on the buyer’s two-item
value space are depicted in Figure 1. Our first result states that the seller never loses by presenting
the buyer with an auction of the submodular type.
Theorem 1.1. For every two distributions D1 and D2, and a single additive buyer with two items’
valuations sampled from D1 ×D2, the revenue of any deterministic mechanism can be obtained by
a deterministic mechanism that is submodular.
This means that the seller will never gain by posting a price for the pair that is higher than
the sum of prices for the two items. This is highly desirable property as it implies that in such
a mechanism a buyer cannot gain by using “false names” [25] and buying each of the two items
separately under a different identity (e.g. when the seller of a digital good faces multiple ex-ante
identical buyers, and she posts the same prices to every buyer.) One practical motivation for false-
name proof mechanisms is that preventing the usage of false names requires verification of identities,
which might be very costly. Another motivation is that for some mechanisms, allowing the buyer
to select multiple menu options may result in exponential savings in representation size5; however
such a representation only makes sense for false-name-proof mechanisms. (See also Remark 7.3 for
further discussion on “menu-size” vs “additive-menu-size”.)
An additional benefit of such a mechanism is that it satisfies revenue monotonicity - it was
shown by [15] that submodular deterministic auctions are revenue monotone6 (i.e. the revenue that
they extract from a player with item values (v1, v2) cannot be lower than the revenue that they
extract from a player with values (v′1, v
′
2) with v
′
1 ≤ v1 and v
′
2 ≤ v2). From the theorem and [15]
we immediately get the next corollary.
Corollary 1.2. For every two distributions D1 and D2, and a single additive buyer with two items’
valuations sampled from D1 ×D2, the revenue of any deterministic mechanism can be obtained by
a deterministic mechanism that is revenue-monotone.
Using Corollary 1.2 we are also able to determine exactly the maximum possible gap between
the optimal revenue by deterministic auctions and the optimal revenue from selling the items
separately. If we denote the optimal revenue of deterministic auctions by DRev(D1 × D2) and
the optimal revenue from selling the two items separately (each at its optimal Myerson price) by
SRev(D1 ×D2) then we get:
Theorem 1.3. For every two distributions D1 and D2 and a single additive buyer with two items’
valuations sampled from D1 × D2, it holds that DRev(D1 × D2) ≤ w · SRev(D1 × D2), where
w ≈ 1.278 is the solution of (w − 1) · ew = 1.
4When c = a+ b the menu is additive - it is both submodular and supermodular. Additive pricing corresponds to
selling the item separately.
5For example, item pricing can be represented with linear menu in the case multiple menu entries can be picked,
but require exponential menu when the buyer can only pick a single entry from the menu
6For the case of two items it is actually easy to see that any submodular deterministic auction is revenue monotone:
increasing values cannot cause the bidder to switch from one item to the other, only from purchasing one item to
buying the pair, and the price of the pair is at least the price of any item.
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This bound is tight as [13] shows that for an “equal revenue distribution7” ER it holds that
DRev(ER×ER) = w ·SRev(ER×ER). It is still open whether the gap between SRev and Rev
(the revenue of the optimal randomized mechanism) is larger or not.
We then note several ways in which Theorem 1.1, which holds for deterministic auctions for an
additive buyer with two independent items, can not be generalized:
1. To more than two items: We exhibit an example where the optimal deterministic auction
for three independent items fails to be submodular.8 We leave as an open problem whether
optimal deterministic auctions for more than two items must at least be subadditive.9
2. To correlated item values: We show that the optimal deterministic auction for correlated
distributions on the two items may fail to be submodular (or monotone). Nevertheless, the
gap between the two is bounded: we show that the maximum possible gap between the
revenues of general deterministic versus submodular deterministic10 auctions in the case of
two items with correlated distributions is 3/2, and this is essentially tight.
3. To randomized auctions: while it is not clear what is the exact analog of submodularity
for a randomized auction, it is known [15] that the optimal randomized auction for two
independently distributed items need not be revenue monotone, in contrast to the revenue
monotonicity result that we present above for deterministic auction (Corollary 1.2). We also
note that while submodular auctions for two items are “false name proof”, optimal randomized
auctions need not be so.
Our second structural result concerns the question of symmetry. Suppose that the two items are
symmetric, i.e. sampled IID from the distribution D1 = D2 = F . Does this also imply that there is
an optimal deterministic auction that is symmetric (both items have the same price)? For general
(not necessarily deterministic) auctions, symmetry may be obtained without loss of generality by
averaging over all possible permutations of the items, but this procedure results in a randomized
auction even when starting with a deterministic one. It turns out that the answer is still positive,
but this is rather delicate.
Theorem 1.4. For any distribution F , and a single additive buyer with two items’ valuations
sampled from F×F , the revenue of any deterministic mechanism can be obtained by a deterministic
mechanism that is symmetric.
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this theorem can not be generalized in each of these natural
ways:
1. To correlated symmetric item values: We show that there exists a correlated symmetric
joint distribution on (v1, v2) such that the revenue of the best symmetric deterministic auction
is strictly less than that of the optimal deterministic auction.
7A distribution for which any price in the support has the same revenue. For a formal definition see Section 3.
8For a set of items M , a pricing function p : 2M → R is submodular if for any S, T ⊆M it holds that p(S)+p(T ) ≥
p(S ∩ T ) + p(S ∪ T ).
9For a set of items M , a pricing function p : 2M → R is subadditive if for any S, T ⊆M it holds that p(S)+p(T ) ≥
p(S ∪ T ).
10Our result is actually a little stronger: we show that the gap is at most 3/2 even if the submodular auction is
restricted to either selling each item separately or offering only the grand bundle.
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2. To more than two IID items: We exhibit an example of a distribution F where for three
items whose values are distributed, independently, according to F , the optimal symmetric
deterministic auction extracts strictly less revenue than the optimal deterministic auction.
In particular, the above examples show that the symmetry of the joint distribution that is implied
by the IID assumption is not sufficient to derive that the optimal pricing is symmetric.
It should be noted that in contrast to the failure of the positive result for deterministic 2-item
case to generalize to joint correlated distributions and to more items, for the case of randomized
auctions and any number of items, it is trivially true that for any symmetric joint distribution
over n items, there exists an optimal randomized auction that is symmetric (by going over all item
permutations.) This is true when item values are samples IID, and it is also true when the items’
values are correlated in a symmetric way.
1.1 Additional related work
There are countless papers dedicated to the topics we touch on in this work, including tradeoffs
between simple and complex mechanisms, structure of optimal mechanisms, false-name proofness,
etc. We shall briefly mention a few below. Thirumulanathan et al. [22] study revenue maximization
for the special case uniforms distributions on intervals of the real line. Conitzer and Sandholm [10]
prove computational intractability albeit for the much more general setting of correlated valuations.
[21, 7, 5] study questions related to ours, but for buyers with unit-demand valuations (whereas we
focus on additive valuations).
2 Preliminaries
A monopolist seller sets up a mechanism to maximize revenue when facing a single buyer. The
buyer has an additive valuation over n items, that is, if his value for item i is vi ≥ 0, his value
for the set of items S is v(S) =
∑
i∈S vi. The values of the items are drawn from a distribution D
which is known to the seller. We mostly focus on the special cases where n = 2 and the value vi
for each item i is drawn independently from a distribution Di, and D = D1 ×D2 × . . .×Dn.
We study the revenue that can be achieved by a monopolist seller facing such a buyer. We
consider deterministic mechanisms that are truthful and ex-post Individually Rational (IR), which
for a single buyer are simply menus that present a price for each bundle, and the buyer picks a
bundle which maximizes his quasi-linear utility (the difference between the value for the bundle
and the payment), breaking ties in favor of higher payments.
Notation
For any joint distribution D of valuations, we use the following notation, mostly due to [13, 3], to
denote the optimum revenue for each class of mechanisms:
• Rev (D) - the supremum revenue among all truthful mechanisms;
• DRev (D) - the supremum revenue among all truthful deterministic mechanisms;
• BRev (D) - the supremum revenue obtainable by pricing only the grand bundle;11 and
11Pricing every non-empty bundle at the same price - WLOG the buyer will either buy all the items, or nothing.
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• SRev (D) - the supremum revenue obtainable by pricing each item separately;12
• SMRev (D) - the supremum revenue among all truthful deterministic mechanisms with sub-
modular pricing.
When D is clear from the context, we simply write Rev,DRev, etc.
We note that the supremum might not be obtained by any mechanism, even when a single
item is for sale to a single buyer, and even if the optimal revenue is bounded from above. To
see this, consider the distribution with support over all non-negative real numbers and for which
Pr[v ≥ p] = 1/(1 + p), for such a distribution the revenue with price p is p/(1 + p) which grows to
1 as p goes to infinity, yet no price obtains revenue of 1. On the other hand, for any distribution
with a finite support the supremum is clearly obtained. When the supremum is obtained, each of
our results that mechanisms with some property X (e.g. submodular) can get the same revenue as
any mechanisms, implies that there is an optimal mechanism with property X.
A deterministic menu for 2 items can be represented by 3 prices: two prices for each of the two
items, and another price for the pair. We use triplets as (p1, p2, p1,2) to denote such a menu, with
p1 and p2 being the prices for the first and second item, respectively, and p1,2 being the price for
the pair, with all prices being non-negative. Note also that without loss of generality, the seller can
restrict her attention to menus with p1,2 ≥ max{p1, p2} as decreasing the price of an item to the
price of the pair never decreases the revenue. We use RevD(x, y, z) to denote the expected revenue
from menu (x, y, z) for the distribution D. When the distribution is clear from the context, we use
the simpler notation Rev(x, y, z).
Revenue Monotonicity
A menu is revenue monotone if the revenue obtained by the menu does not decrease when the value
of every item weakly increases. That is, a revenue monotone menu satisfies the condition that the
revenue from a player with item values (v1, v2) cannot be lower than the revenue extracted from a
player with values (v′1, v
′
2) with v
′
1 ≤ v1 and v
′
2 ≤ v2.
3 Deterministic Pricing for Two Independent Items
We prove that for two independent items and an additive buyer, a deterministic seller does not lose
revenue by restricting herself to mechanisms that are submodular. We do so by showing that the
revenue of any supermodular menu is dominated by the revenue of one out of two additive menus
that are derived from the supermodular menu.
Theorem 3.1 (Theorem 1.1 restated). For every two distributions D1 and D2, and a single additive
buyer with two items’ valuations sampled from D1×D2, the revenue of any deterministic mechanism
can be obtained by a deterministic mechanism that is submodular. Thus, SMRev(D1 × D2) =
DRev(D1 ×D2),
Proof. Given a strictly supermodular menu (a, b, c) (selling item 1, item 2, and the grand bundle for
prices a, b, c, respectively), assume wlog that a ≤ b. By strict supermodularity, c > a+ b ≥ b. We
argue that at least one of the following additive menus achieves at least as much revenue: selling
12Every bundle is priced at the sum of prices of the items in the bundle.
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the items separately for prices a, b, respectively (menu (a, b, a+ b)), and selling separately for prices
c− b, c (menu (c− b, b, c)).13
The first step of the proof is to consider the partition of the valuation space induced by the
incentive compatibility constraints of the three menus, and to compute the payments in each region
(see Figure 2 for details). We now split into cases depending on the ratio between Pr
[
v1 ∈ [a, c−b)
]
and Pr
[
v1 ≥ c− b
]
. (Notice that this step only makes sense for independent valuations.) We show
that when
Pr
[
v1 ∈ [a, c− b)
]
· a ≥ Pr
[
v1 ≥ c− b
]
·
(
c− (a+ b)
)
, (1)
the menu (a, b, a+ b) obtains at least as much revenue as menu (a, b, c), while when this is violated,
the menu (c− b, b, c) obtains at least as much revenue as menu (a, b, c).
Detailed explanations
Below we explain why in each case the respective submodular menu is at least as good as super-
modular menu (a, b, c). Refer also to Figure 2.
First, we argue that when Inequality (1) holds, menu (a, b, a + b) obtains at least as much
revenue as menu (a, b, c). This is so as both menus obtain the same revenue for any valuations with
v2 ≤ b, and for any v2 > b, due to independence, the contribution to the expected gain of the event
v1 ∈ [a, c− b) is at least as large as the contributed expected loss of the event v1 ≥ c− b (note that
for v2 such that b ≤ v2 ≤ c− a, the menu (a, b, a+ b) obtains at least as much revenue as the menu
(a, b, c), so it is enough to look at v2 > c− a and use independence).
Finally, we argue that when Inequality (1) fails to hold, menu (c − b, b, c) obtains at least as
much revenue as menu (a, b, c). This is so as menu (c − b, b, c) obtains at least as much revenue
as menu (a, b, c) for any valuations with v2 ≥ b, and for any v2 < b, due to independence, the
contribution to the expected gain of the event v1 ≥ c − b is at least as large as the contributed
expected loss of the event v1 ∈ [a, c− b).
Hart and Reny [15, Corollary 9] have shown that submodular menus are revenue-monotone, i.e.
when facing a higher (stochastically-dominating) valuation distribution, their revenue can never
decrease. The following corollary thus follows immediately from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2 (Corollary 1.2 restated). For every two distributions D1 and D2, and a single
additive buyer with two items’ valuations sampled from D1 × D2, the revenue of any deterministic
mechanism can be obtained by a deterministic mechanism that is revenue-monotone.
3.1 SRev vs DRev
From Corollary 3.2 we are able to determine exactly the maximum possible gap between the optimal
deterministic auction and the optimal revenue from selling the two items separately.
Theorem 3.3 (Theorem 1.3 restated). Let w ≈ 1.278 be the solution of the equation (w−1)·ew = 1.
For every two distributions D1 and D2 it holds that DRev(D1×D2) ≤ w ·SRev(D1×D2). That is,
any revenue-optimal deterministic mechanism for selling two items with independent distributions
obtains at most w-times more revenue than selling each item separately. Furthermore, this is tight
even for IID item distributions.
13It may not be immediately intuitive why charging c− b for the first item is a good idea. However, we expect to
have probability mass at v1 ≈ c − b because this is where, when facing the original supermodular menu, the buyer
switches from buying item 2 to the grand bundle.
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Figure 2: Submodular menus are optimal
a
b
c− b
c− a
a
b
c
Payments to seller with strictly supermodular menu
(a, b, c), satisfying c > a+ b.
a
b
a
b a + b
Payments to seller with the additive menu (a, b, a+ b).
a
b
c− b
b c
Payments to seller with the additive menu (c− b, b, c).
a
b
c− b
c− a
c− (a + b)−a
a
bb
(a + b)− c
In each region, we compute the difference in revenues of
two menus.
Above v2 = b: (a, b, a+ b) vs. (a, b, c) ((c− b, b, c)
dominates (a, b, c)).
Below v2 = b: (c− b, b, c) vs. (a, b, c) ((a, b, a+ b) and
(a, b, c) are the same).
The tightness of our result follows from a result of [13], that shows that for any “equal revenue
distribution” ER, it holds that DRev(ER×ER) = w ·SRev(ER×ER). We next formally define
equal revenue distributions - distributions such that any price that generates positive revenue,
generates the same revenue.
Definition 3.4 (Equal Revenue Distribution). For r > 0, let the r-equal revenue distribution,
denoted by ER(r), be the single-item valuation distribution whose cdf satisfies:
Pr
v∼ER(r)
[v ≥ p] = min {1, r/p} .
We next show that the revenue-optimal deterministic mechanism for selling two items whose
valuations are drawn from independent (but possibly different) equal revenue distributions always
sells both items together (i.e. DRev = BRev for two independent equal revenue distributions).
Lemma 3.5. For any r1, r2 > 0 it holds that
DRev(ER(r1)× ER(r2)) = BRev(ER(r1)× ER(r2))
Proof. Fix a menu m = (a, b, c) and assume WLOG that a ≤ b ≤ c. To prove the claim we show
that any revenue that can be obtained by a deterministic menu, can also be obtain by a menu
in which the buyer never strictly prefers to buy a single item (over buying the pair or getting
nothing). A sufficient condition for such a menu is that a = b = c. Consider any deterministic
menu m = (a, b, c) such that a < c, that is, it sells item 1 for a cheaper price a than the price c
charged for the bundle. We will show that increasing the price of item 1 to c can only increase
the revenue (the same arguments will clearly hold for the second item as well). That is, the menu
m′ = (c, b, c) generates at least as much revenue as the menu m = (a, b, c).
For v2 ≥ c−a the allocation and payments for both menus m and m
′ are the same, as it is never
the case that the first item is bought alone, see Figure 3 for an illustration. We next argue about
the case that v2 < c − a. For any such case, it holds that for any fixed v2 the revenue with menu
m is r1 (since item 2 is never sold and v1 is distributed according to the equal revenue distribution
ER(r1)). On the other hand, for m
′, for any such v2 < c− a the buyer either gets nothing or buys
the pair, and the pair is sold in the event that v1 + v2 ≥ c which happen with probability at least
as large as the probability that v1 ≥ c. As selling item 1 at price c alone generates revenue r1, the
menu m′ which sells with at least as high probability, generates at least as high revenue.
We use the next Lemma from [13] in the proof of Theorem 3.3 below.
Lemma 3.6 ([13, Lemma 13]). For every two distributions D1 and D2,
BRev(D1 ×D2) ≤ w · SRev(D1 ×D2)
Furthermore, for some distributions this holds as equality (the result is tight).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. For i = 1, 2 let ri = Rev(Di) be the optimal revenue from selling item i
that is sampled from the distribution Di. We note that any item value distribution F for which
the optimal revenue is r, is stochastically dominated by the distribution ER(r). This implies, by
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Figure 3: DREV equals BREV for ER distributions
a
b
c
a
b
c− b
c− a
Payments with menu m = (a, b, c).
b
c
a
b
c− b
c− a
c
Payments with menu m′ = (c, b, c). Item 1 is never sold
alone. For values v2 ≥ c− a the allocation and payments
for both menus are the same.
Corollary 3.2, that DRev(D1 × D2) ≤ DRev(ER(r1) × ER(r2)). We use this as the first step in
our proof:
DRev(D1 ×D2) ≤ DRev(ER(r1)× ER(r2)) (DRev is monotone by Cor. 3.2)
≤ BRev(ER(r1)× ER(r2)) (Lemma 3.5)
≤ w · SRev(ER(r1)× ER(r2)) (Lemma 3.6)
= w · (r1 + r2) (Def. of SRev, ER distributions)
= w · SRev(D1 ×D2) (Def. of r1, r2).
4 Deterministic Pricing for Two IID Items
Assume that the two items are ex-ante symmetric, will a deterministic seller lose revenue by re-
stricting her menu to be symmetric (p1 = p2)? For independent items, symmetric items means
that they are sampled IID. We show that the optimum revenue by deterministic mechanisms for
selling two IID items can be achieved by symmetric deterministic mechanisms. We later show that
the symmetry of the joint distribution of two IID items is not sufficient to prove this result - for
correlated symmetric distribution the result does not hold. We demonstrate this by presenting an
example in which an asymmetric deterministic mechanism generates higher revenue than the best
symmetric deterministic mechanism (Example 6.3).
We prove that for two IID items restricting to symmetric menus does not decrease the revenue.
The proof is similar in spirit to the proof of Theorem 3.1 but is much more involved and delicate.
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Theorem 4.1 (Theorem 1.4 restated). For any value distribution F , and a single additive buyer
with two items’ valuations sampled from F × F , the revenue of any deterministic mechanism can
be obtained by a deterministic mechanism that is symmetric.
Proof. Given an asymmetric deterministic menu (that prices the two items differently), we construct
a symmetric menu that obtains at least as much revenue.
Let a, b, c denote the prices that the asymmetric menu charges for item 1, item 2, and the
bundle, respectively. Wlog, we can assume that a < b ≤ c. Furthermore, by Theorem 3.1, we can
assume wlog that c ≤ a+ b. It follows immediately that also c ≤ 2b, but we do not know whether
c > 2a. Our proof proceeds by analyzing separately the two possible cases.
The case where c ≤ 2a
The case when c ≤ 2a is the easy one. We show below that in this case, the symmetric menus
(a, a, c) and (b, b, c) (i.e. charge both items a, respectively b) perform on average exactly as well as
the original asymmetric menu (a, b, c). Thus at least one of those symmetric menus has to yield at
least as much revenue as the asymmetric menu (a, b, c).
To prove that menus (a, a, c) and (b, b, c) yield as much revenue, on average, as the asymmetric
menu, we partition the valuation space across the line v1 = v2. For v1 ≥ v2, we argue that a buyer
facing menus (a, a, c) or (a, b, c) never buys item 2 by itself (without item 1). For menu (a, a, c),
since v1 ≥ v2 and c ≤ 2a, if v2 ≥ a then v1 + v2 − c ≥ v1 − a+ v2 − a ≥ v2 − a and thus whenever
item 2 gives non-negative utility, the pair is preferred to buying item 2 by itself. For menu (a, b, c),
v1 ≥ v2 and a < b implies v1 − a > v2 − b, thus buying item 1 by itself is preferred to buying item
2 by itself. Similarly, for v1 < v2, a buyer facing menus (a, b, c) or (b, b, c) never buys item 1 by
itself, so they yield the same revenue. For menu (a, b, c), since v1 < v2 and c ≤ 2a, if v1 ≥ a then
v2 > a ≥ c − a and thus v1 + v2 − c ≥ v1 − a, so whenever item 1 gives non-negative utility, the
pair is preferred to buying item 1 by itself. For menu (b, b, c), v1 < v2 implies v1 − b < v2 − b, thus
buying item 1 by itself is preferred to buying item 2 by itself.
By symmetry, menus (a, b, c) and (b, a, c) yield the same revenue; (b, a, c) is identical to (a, a, c)
on v1 < v2, and identical to (b, b, c) on v1 ≥ v2. Therefore,
Rev(a, a, c) +Rev(b, b, c) = Rev(a, b, c) +Rev(b, a, c) = 2Rev(a, b, c), (2)
where Rev(x, y, z) denotes the expected revenue from menu (x, y, z) for the given distribution. See
also Figure 4. Notice that this argument also works for correlated symmetric distributions.
The case where c > 2a
We consider three alternative symmetric menus: (a, a, 2a), (b, b, c), and (c−a, c−a, 2c− 2a).14 We
show that at least one of them yields at least as much revenue as the asymmetric menu. Specifically,
we consider the following two cases:
• When
2a · Pr
[
a ≤ v2 < c− a
]
≥ (c− 2a) · Pr
[
v2 ≥ c− a
]
, (3)
14Informally, we expect to have probability mass at vi ≈ c−a (for i = 1, 2) because this is where the buyer switches
from item 1 to the bundle in the asymmetric menu.
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Figure 4: Symmetric menus are optimal (Case c ≤ 2a)
a
b
c− b
c− a
Incentive constraints induced by menus (a, b, c), (b, a, c) (dotted), (b, b, c), and (a, a, c).
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we show that
Rev(b, b, c) +Rev(a, a, 2a) ≥ Rev(a, b, c) +Rev(b, a, c) = 2Rev(a, b, c).
thus one of the menus (b, b, c) or (a, a, 2a) has revenue as least as high as the menu (a, b, c).
• When
2a · Pr
[
a ≤ v2 < c− a
]
≤ (c− 2a) · Pr
[
v2 ≥ c− a
]
, (4)
we show that
Rev(b, b, c) +Rev(c− a, c− a, 2c− 2a) ≥ Rev(a, b, c) +Rev(b, a, c) = 2Rev(a, b, c).
thus one of the menus (b, b, c) or (c − a, c − a, 2c − 2a) has revenue as least as high as the
menu (a, b, c).
Both proofs proceed as follows. First, we consider the partition of the valuation space induced
by the incentive constraints of the respective four mechanisms (we consider a total of five menus,
but we only need four for each case). Then, for each region of the space, we sum the payments to
the seller in the symmetric menus, and subtract the payments in the asymmetric menus. At this
point, we still have some regions with negative and positive contributions. We now use the fact that
the two items are symmetrically distributed to observe that the revenue contribution of one region
of valuations is exactly equal to the contribution of the symmetric region (when reflecting over the
v1 = v2 line), and we rearrange the revenue contributions without changing the total revenue using
this fact. Finally, we use the inequality on the single dimensional distributions (Inequality (4) or
(3)) to show that the positive contributions outweigh the negative contributions. We note that this
last argument is only true for the IID case and it fails for correlated distribution – and indeed the
claim is false for such distributions, see Example 6.3. See Figures 5 and 6 for more details.
5 More than Two Items
In this section we show that our results for two items do not extend even to three items, even when
the values of the three items are sampled IID from a distribution with a finite support. While for
two independent items the revenue of a deterministic menu can be obtained with a submodular
menu, for three IID items this is not true. Additionally, for three items symmetric menus are losing
revenue compared to arbitrary deterministic menus.
Theorem 5.1. There exist a distribution F with finite support such that for three items sampled IID
from F (D = F ×F ×F), the following holds15: The expected revenue of the optimal deterministic
mechanism is strictly larger than both the expected revenue of the optimal symmetric deterministic
mechanism and of the optimal submodular deterministic mechanism.
The theorem directly follows from the next example which further shows that imposing both
symmetry and submodularity decreases the revenue even more than imposing only one of them.
15Note that since the support is finite, the optimal mechanism in each case is indeed obtained.
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Figure 5: Symmetric menus are optimal (Case c > 2a): the menus
b
b
c
a
b
c− b
Payments to seller with menu (b, b, c). Note that the
menu (b, b, c) is submodular as 2b ≥ a+ b ≥ c, so this
plot as a submodular menu is correct (see Figure 1 for
the difference in plots of submodular and supermodular
menus).
c− a
c− a 2c− 2a
c− a
c− a
Payments to seller with menu (c− a, c− a, 2c− 2a).
a
a 2a
a
a
Payments to seller with menu (a, a, 2a).
a
a+ b
2a
a+ c 2c
a
a+ b
a+ c
a
b
c− b
c− a
Sum of payments from menus (a, b, c) and (b, a, c)
(dotted).a
aSee also the right plot in Figure 1.
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Figure 6: Symmetric menus are optimal (Case c > 2a): averaging arguments
c
a 2a− c
a
a
b
c− b
c− a
c
2a 2a − c
a
b
c− b
c− a
Menus (a, b, c), (b, a, c) (dotted), (b, b, c), and (a, a, a).
On the left: the number inside each region represents the sum of contributions from (b, b, c) and (a, a, 2a), minus the
contributions from (a, b, c) and (b, a, c).
On the right: we rearranged the payments, moving a from the right-center region to the top-center region. By
symmetry, the probability mass on those two regions is the same, so the total revenue does not change. Whenever
(3) holds, we have that the total contribution in each horizontal line (fixed v2) is nonnegative.
−a
c−
2a
c−2a
−2a
c−2a
c− 2a c− 2a
−a
c− 2a
c−
2a
c− 2a
a
b
c− b
c− a
c−
2a
c−2a
−2a
c−2a
c− 2a c− 2a
−2a
c− 2a
c−
2a
c− 2a
a
b
c− b
c− a
Menus (a, b, c), (b, a, c) (dotted), (b, b, c), and (c− a, c− a, 2c− 2a).
On the left: The number inside each region represents the sum of contributions from (b, b, c) and (c−a, c−a, 2c−2a),
minus the contributions from (a, b, c) and (b, a, c).
On the right: We rearranged the payments, moving a from the left-center region to the center-bottom region. By
symmetry, the probability mass on those two regions is the same, so the total revenue does not change. Notice that
whenever (4) holds, we have that the total contribution in each horizontal line (fixed v2) is nonnegative.
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Example 5.2 (n = 3). Let F be following discrete distribution that samples values uniformly
from the multi-set [0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 6, 6, 6], that is: Pr[v = 0] = Pr[v = 1] = Pr[v = 5] = 0.1,
Pr[v = 2] = 0.4 and Pr[v = 6] = 0.3. It holds that:
• The expected revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism is 6.293.
• The expected revenue of the optimal symmetric deterministic mechanism is 6.291.
• The expected revenue of the optimal submodular deterministic mechanism is 6.292.
• The expected revenue of the optimal symmetric and submodular deterministic mechanism is
6.288.
First, observe that it is enough to only consider integer prices, bounded above by appropriate prices
(e.g., not more than 6 for a single item, not more than 12 for 2 items, etc.). Using this fact, by
exhaustive search we found the optimal mechanisms in each class. These optimal mechanisms, with
prices (p1, p2, p3, p1,2, p1,3, p2,3, p1,2,3), are as follows:
• (6, 6, 6, 7, 7, 8, 9) is an optimal deterministic mechanism;
• (6, 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 9) is an optimal symmetric deterministic mechanism;
• (5, 6, 6, 7, 7, 8, 9) is an optimal submodular deterministic mechanism; and
• (5, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 9) is an optimal symmetric and submodular deterministic mechanism.
This example does not rule out, however, that subadditive deterministic mechanisms can get as
much revenue as any other deterministic mechanism. Resolving whether this is indeed the case is
the main open problem we propose in this work:
Open Question 5.3. For n > 2 items with independent valuations, is it true that the revenue of
any deterministic mechanism can be obtained by a deterministic mechanism that is subadditive?
Additionally, we have shown that for two items, revenue-monotone deterministic mechanisms
can get as much revenue as any other mechanisms. We leave open the question if this is true for
more than two items.
Open Question 5.4. For n > 2 items with independent valuations, is it true that the revenue
of any deterministic mechanism can be obtained by a deterministic mechanism that is revenue
monotone?
6 Correlated Valuations
We next aim to understand to what extent the results for deterministic auction for selling two items
with values sampled independently, extend to two item with values sampled from a correlated joint
distribution. We have seen that for two independent items restricting to submodular menu does
not result in any revenue loss for the seller. We next show that for correlated items, the situation
is very different - moving from submodular menu to an unrestricted one can increase the revenue
of the seller, and that increase can be as large as almost 50%. We also show that this is tight and
the gain is never larger than 50%.
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6.1 Price of Submodularity
The following example shows that for two items with values sampled from a correlated distribution,
the optimal deterministic auction can gain almost 50% more revenue than the optimal deterministic
submodular auction — and this is true even for a symmetric correlated distribution.
Example 6.1 (DRev ≥ (3/2−ε)SMRev). Fix a small ε > 0. Consider two items with valuations
drawn from the following distribution:
(v1, v2) =


(4, 0) w.p. 1/2− ε
(0, 4) w.p. 1/2− ε
(1/ε, 1/ε) w.p. 2ε
.
There is a high-revenue deterministic auction that charges 4 for each item or 1/ε for the grand
bundle. Its revenue is DRev ≥ 4(1 − 2ε) + (1/ε) · 2ε = 6− O(ε). In contrast we show below that
any submodular auction has revenue at most 4 +O(ε).
We consider three different cases:
• If the auction prices each of the two items at a price larger than 4, the buyer does not buy
anything for any valuation in her support except (1/ε, 1/ε). The seller’s revenue is at most
the welfare from this event, (1/ε + 1/ε) · 2ε = 4.
• Suppose the auction charges at most 4 for one of the items, and more than 4 for the other
item. Then the grand bundle never sells for price more than 1/ε + 4 — otherwise even
with valuration (1/ε, 1/ε) the buyer prefers buying the cheaper item over the grand bundle.
Furthermore, the buyer never buys the more expensive item. Therefore the seller’s revenue is
bounded from above by 2 from selling the cheaper item and 2 + O(ε) from selling the grand
bundle.
• Finally, any submodular auction that charges at most 4 for both items (and hence, by sub-
modularity, at most 8 for the grand bundle) can make at most O(ε) revenue from the high
valuation.
The following lemma shows that the previous example is tight.
Lemma 6.2. For any joint value distribution D over two items it holds that
DRev(D) ≤ (3/2) · SMRev(D).
Proof. Throughout the proof we useRev(x, y, z) to denote the expected revenue from menu (x, y, z)
over the distribution D. Fix any deterministic menu (p1, p2, p1,2). Assume that the menu m =
(p1, p2, p1,2) is not submodular, that is, p1,2 > p1 + p2. Let A∅, A1, A2, A1,2 denote the events that,
given prices p1, p2, and p1,2, the buyer buys the empty set, only item 1, etc. Now, the revenue from
the menu (p1, p2, p1,2) is given by:
Rev(p1, p2, p1,2) = Pr[A1]p1 + Pr[A2]p2 + Pr[A1,2]p1,2.
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Let p = 2p1,2 − p1 − p2. To complete the proof we will show that we can bound Rev(m) =
Rev(p1, p2, p1,2) by half the revenue obtained by selling only the grand bundle at price p (with the
menu (p, p, p)) plus the revenue obtained by selling the two items separately at prices p1 and p2
(with the additive menu (p1, p2, p1 + p2)). This implies that 3/2 times the better revenue of the
two menus, is at least the revenue of the menu m. I.e. we show that
Rev(m) ≤ Rev(p1, p2, p1+p2)+(1/2)Rev(p, p, p) ≤ (3/2) ·max{Rev(p1, p2, p1+p2),Rev(p, p, p)},
which is clearly sufficient to complete the proof as the menus (p1, p2, p1 + p2) and (p, p, p) are both
submodular.
For any valuation (v1, v2) for which the buyer buys the grand bundle (i.e. event A1,2 occurs) with
menu (p1, p2, p1,2), it holds that he prefers the bundle over any item i ∈ {1, 2}, thus v1+ v2−p1,2 ≥
vi − pi. So by summing these two up, in any such case it holds that v1 + v2 ≥ 2p1,2 − p1 − p2 = p.
Thus with menu (p, p, p), for any such valuation the buyer prefers buying the grand bundle over
the empty set. Therefore,
Rev(p, p, p) ≥ Pr[A1,2](2p1,2 − p1 − p2).
Additionally, for the mechanism that offers each item i separately for price pi (and the bundle
for p1+p2) it holds that for buyer’s valuations in event A1,2, the buyer buys both items since for any
items i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} as v1+ v2− p1,2 ≥ vi− pi it holds that vj ≥ p1,2− pi > pj (by supermodularity
of the menu (p1, p2, p1,2)), thus
Rev(p1, p2, p1 + p2) ≥ (Pr[A1] + Pr[A1,2])p1 + (Pr[A2] + Pr[A1,2])p2.
Combining the above two inequalities:
Rev(p1, p2, p1 + p2) + (1/2)Rev(p, p, p)
≥ (Pr[A1] + Pr[A1,2])p1 + (Pr[A2] + Pr[A1,2])p2 + Pr[A1,2](p1,2 − p1/2 − p2/2)
= (Pr[A1] + Pr[A1,2]/2)p1 + (Pr[A2] + Pr[A1,2]/2)p2 + Pr[A1,2]p1,2
≥ Pr[A1]p1 + Pr[A2]p2 + Pr[A1,2]p1,2
= Rev(p1, p2, p1,2).
6.2 Symmetric vs Asymmetric Menus
Consider a joint distribution that is symmetric. Will a deterministic seller lose revenue by restricting
her menu to be symmetric when items are correlated? We next show that for correlated distributions
over two items, the fact that the joint distribution is symmetric is not sufficient to ensure that
there is an optimal deterministic menu that is symmetric. Moreover, there is a constant factor gap
between the achievable revenues.
Example 6.3 (Asymmetric menus for symmetric distributions). Fix a small ε > 0 and consider
the following correlated distribution over two-item valuations:
(v1, v2) ∼


(1/ε2, 1/ε2) w.p. ε2
(1/ε, 0) w.p. ε/2
(0, 1/ε) w.p. ε/2
(1, 1) otherwise
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There is a deterministic asymmetric menu with prices (1, 1/ε, 1/ε2) and it obtains revenue of 5/2−
O(ε).
In contrast, we claim that any symmetric menu (p, p, q) yields revenue at most 2 + ε. We
consider three different cases, depending on the price p of any of the items by itself (notice that by
the symmetry restriction they are priced the same).
• Case p > 1/ε: the buyer buys nothing unless she has valuation (1/ε2, 1/ε2). Thus the expected
revenue is at most 2.
• Case 1 < p ≤ 1/ε: the buyer never buys a single item when his valuation is (1, 1). If
a buyer with valuation (1/ε2, 1/ε2) does not buy the bundle, the revenue is bounded by
p · (ε + ε2) ≤ (1/ε) · (ε + ε2) = 1 + ε. If a buyer with valuation (1/ε2, 1/ε2) does buy the
bundle, it must be the case that 2/ε2 − q ≥ 1/ε2 − p and so q ≤ 1/ε2 + p. If q ≤ 1/ε the
revenue is bounded from above by (1/ε) · (ε+ε2) = 1+ε. Otherwise, players with types other
than (1/ε2, 1/ε2) do not buy the bundle, and the revenue is bounded by
q · ε2 + p · ε ≤ (1/ε2 + p) · ε2 + p · ε = 1 + p(ε+ ε2) ≤ 1 + (1/ε) · (ε+ ε2) = 2 + ε
• Case p ≤ 1: selling items by themselves can yield a revenue of at most p · 1 ≤ 1 (together). If
q ≤ 2, the revenue is bounded by 2. If 2 < q ≤ 1/ε the revenue from selling at q is bounded
from above by (1/ε) · (ε + ε2) = 1 + ε, so the total revenue is bounded by 2 + ε. Otherwise,
players with types other than (1/ε2, 1/ε2) do not buy the bundle, and the revenue is bounded
by
q · ε2 + p · 1 ≤ (1/ε2 + p) · ε2 + p = 1 + p(1 + ε2) ≤ 1 + 1 · (1 + ε2) = 2 + ε2
7 Randomized Mechanisms
For symmetric distributions, the optimal randomized mechanism is trivially symmetric (given an
asymmetric mechanism, we can run either this mechanism or its reflection with probability 50%).
Hence Theorem 4.1 trivially extends to randomized mechanism.
It is natural to ask whether the result of Theorem 3.1 can also be extended to randomized
mechanisms. However, it is not even clear how to extend the definition of submodularity to ran-
domized menus. Below we discuss a few different natural randomized analogs and observe that
submodular menus need not be optimal for randomized mechanisms in any of these analogs, even
for finite-support distributions.
First we note that for two items, the classes of budget-additive, submodular, fractionally sub-
additive, and subadditive functions are identical (in general there are strict containment between
those classes, in the above order). While we don’t know of a good analog of submodular functions
to randomized mechanisms, the other three notions have natural extensions.
Budget-linear menus A budget-additive menu, charges, for each bundle S, the sum of the item
prices up to a cap (“budget”) b; i.e. pS = min{b,
∑
i∈S pi}. It is natural to extend such menus to
budget-linear menus where, for each vector pi ∈ [0, 1]n of probabilities, the buyer has to pay
ppi , min
{
b,
∑
i∈[n]
pii · pi
}
.
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Fractionally subadditive menus One way to define fractionally subadditive functions is by
their XOS formulation: pS = maxα∈A
{∑
i∈S pi,α
}
(for some finite set A). Similarly to the budget-
linear definition, this can be extended as:
ppi , max
α
{∑
i
pi,α · pii
}
.
False-name-proof mechanisms A nice characterization of subadditive deterministic menus is
that they are false-name-proof, i.e. a buyer is never better off participating in the mechanism
several times. For randomized mechanisms, there is some subtlety in defining what we mean by
participating in the mechanism several times: how do we model the situation where the buyer
chooses to receive item i with probabilities pii and then returns choose to receive the same item
with probability ρi? One option, is to think of the probabilities as fractional allocations of a divisible
goods, and let them add up, with a cap at 1, i.e. min{1, pii + ρi}. Note that it doesn’t make sense
to allocate more than 1 unit of item i. Notice also that this definition generalizes budget-linear
and fractionally subadditive menus. Alternatively, returning to the probabilities interpretation,
we may think of two independent lotteries, i.e. the new probability is 1 − (1 − pii)(1 − ρi). For
this option, we again have a couple of modeling choices: either the buyer is adaptive and observes
the lottery outcomes before participating in the mechanism again, or non-adaptive. Notice that
the non-adaptive probabilistic buyer is the weakest, hence this is the most general definition of
false-name-proofness.
The optimal (randomized) mechanism might not satisfy any of the generalizations of submod-
ular menus suggested above — even for two items with i.i.d. valuations with finite support. We
prove that the revenue obtainable from a non-adaptive probabilistic buyer (that is allowed to non-
adaptively pick more than one entry from the menu of lotteries) is strictly lower than the revenue
obtainable from a buyer that is restricted to pick exactly one entry from the menu.
Theorem 7.1. There exist a distribution F with finite support such that for two items sampled
IID from F (D = F ×F), the following holds16: When the buyer is allowed to pick only one entry
from the menu, there is an optimal randomized mechanism with a finite menu. In the model where
a non-adaptive probabilistic buyer (see description above) is allowed to pick more than one entry
from the menu, the optimum expected revenue is strictly lower.
Not surprisingly, the theorem follows directly from an example due to Hart and Reny [15,
Example 2], who used it to show that the optimal mechanism may be non-monotone (recall that
submodular mechanisms are always monotone; however the other direction is false).
Example 7.2 (Optimal mechanisms are not false-name-proof [15]). Consider the following valua-
tion distribution:
F ∼


10 w.p. 23999000
13 w.p. 19000
46 w.p. 190
47 w.p. 13
80 w.p. 730
100 w.p. 745
16Note that since the support is finite, the optimal mechanism in each case is indeed obtained.
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Hart and Reny [15] argue that the following menu is the unique optimal mechanism for selling
two items with i.i.d. valuations, each distributed according to F :
Allocation Payment
(0, 0) 0(
32
1187 ,
384
13057
)
34240
13057(
384
13057 ,
32
1187
)
34240
13057(
35
1187 ,
35
1187
)
3258
1187(
32
1187 ,
5647
5935
)
90672
1187(
5647
5935 ,
32
1187
)
90672
1187(
35
1187 ,
5647
5935
)
90810
1187(
5647
5935 ,
35
1187
)
90810
1187
(0, 1) 80
(1, 0) 80
(1, 1) 126
In this mechanism, a buyer with valuation (46, 80) chooses bundle
(
35
1187 ,
5647
5935
)
(this can be
verified by comparing her utility for each of the 11 menu options); after subtracting her payment,
her utility is:
46 ·
35
1187
+ 80 ·
5647
5935
−
90810
1187
=
1152
1187
≈ 0.97.
In contrast, if allowed to participate in the mechanism twice, the buyer would, for example,
prefer the first two menu items, which together give her utility of:
(46 + 80) ·
(
1−
(
1−
32
1187
)(
1−
32
1187
))
− 2 ·
34240
13057
≈ 1.46.
In this example, the revenue that the seller obtains from the optimal menu when the buyer is
only allowed to pick one entry, is strictly smaller than the revenue from the same menu when the
buyer is allowed to pick two entries. We argue that for this example, the optimal revenue from any
menu in which the buyer is allowed to pick multiple entries (using ”false names”) is smaller by a
positive constant factor from the revenue of the optimal menu when the buyer must pick a single
entry.
Formally, to prove that there is indeed some positive constant gap, we have to rule out a sequence
of false-name proof mechanisms whose revenue approaches that of Example 7.2. By [15], the latter is
the unique optimum of the standard revenue maximization LP. Furthermore, the set of mechanisms
for which the false-name deviation in Example 7.2 does not increase the buyer’s expected utility is
separated by a linear constraint (hyperplane) from the optimal auction. Therefore, their revenue
cannot approach the optimal auction without obtaining it.
Thus, although we do not try to estimate the maximal gap between false-name proof mechanisms
and optimal mechanisms, it is interesting that the above example proves that the gap is at least
some positive constant.
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Remark 7.3. This is of particular interest in the context of the “additive-menu-size” complexity
measure suggested in [14]. Hart and Nisan [14] observe that even simple mechanisms like selling
each item separately have exponentially long description (menu-size) when written as a menu, or
list of (allocation, price) options presented to the buyer. To alleviate this issue, they proposed a
relaxed measure of additive-menu-size where the buyer can select multiple options from a menu; for
example, selling each item separately has only a linear additive-menu-size. The former observation
was used in [2] to prove an exponential lower bound on the menu-size complexity of any mechanism
that achieves near-optimal revenue; a prelimenary version of [2] left as an open problem whether
better upper bounds on additive-menu-size of near-optimal mechanism can be obtained in general.
Example 7.2 in this section answers this question on the negative in a very strong sense: the
example implies that for some distributions additive-menu-size complexity is not even defined for
any near-optimal mechanism.
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